Matt Taibbi at Skylight Studio in New York, 10/27/10 (photo: Neilson Barnard/Getty Images) |
31 May 12
It’s a speech whose full lunacy is hard to grasp without some background.
It’s by now been well-established that the S.E.C.’s
performance in policing Wall Street before, after, and during the crash
has been comically inept. It would be putting it generously to say that
the top cop on the financial services beat has demonstrated particular
incompetence with regard to investigations of high-profile targets at
powerhouse banks and financial companies. A less generous interpretation
would be that the agency is simply too afraid, too unwilling, or too
corrupt to take on the really dangerous animals in this particular
jungle.
The S.E.C.’s failure to make even one case against a
high-ranking executive involved in the mass frauds leading to the 2008
crash – compare this to the comparatively much smaller and less serious
S&L crisis twenty years earlier, when the government made 1,100
criminal cases and sent 800 bank officials to jail – became so
conspicuous that by the end of last year, the “No prosecutions of top figures” idea became an accepted meme in mainstream news media coverage of the economic crisis.
The S.E.C. in recent years has failed in almost every
possible way a regulator can fail to police powerful criminals. Failure
#1 was that it repeatedly fell down on the job even when alerted to
problems at big companies well ahead of time by insiders. Six months
before Lehman Brothers collapsed, setting off a chain reaction of losses
that crippled the world economy, one of Lehman’s attorneys, Oliver
Budde, contacted the S.E.C. to warn them that the firm had understated
CEO Dick Fuld's income by more than $200 million; the agency blew him off. There were similar brush-offs of insiders with compelling information in cases involving Moody’s, Chase, and both of the major Ponzi scheme scandals, i.e. the Bernie Madoff and Allen Stanford cases.
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