The Failure to Intercept: Timeline and Over 50 Questions the 9/11 Commission

The Failure to Intercept: Timeline and Over 50 Questions the 9/11 Commission Part II Should Ask High Officials

By: Joël v.d. Reijden | Date: April 6, 2015 | Last update: Jan. 28, 2016 | 9/11 STUDY CENTER

"The decades-old procedure for a quick response by the nation's air defense had been changed in June of 2001. Now, instead of NORAD's military commanders being able to issue the command to launch fighter jets, approval had to be sought from the civilian Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. This change is extremely significant, because Mr. Rumsfeld claims to have been "out of the loop" nearly the entire morning of 9/11. ... The families of the vanished bodies and unsettled souls of 9/11 are still waiting to have the dots connected."

June 21, 2004, New York Observer, '9/11 Tapes Reveal Ground Personnel Muffled Attacks'

Contents

1. Intro
2. Oversight
3. A timeline of unprecedented failure
4. Basic conclusions on timeline


5. Additional questions for NORAD
6. Additional questions for the FAA and General Mike Canavan
7. Additional questions for Bush and Cheney
8. Additional questions for Rumsfeld
9. Additional questions for Norman Mineta
10. Additional questions for the original 9/11 Commission


11. Notes

"We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information [about this non-existent phantom aircraft]. ... This response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense. ... No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77. ... FAA headquarters [didn't] pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military... Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area [which was already wrong] as instructed, but east over the ocean [which was double wrong]. ... The President told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach key officials [but initially refused to talk to Rice] ... [At 9:46] staff reported that they were still trying to locate Secretary Rumsfeld [then on the Pentagon lawn]... The President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for the first time that morning shortly after 10:00. No one can recall the content of this conversation..."

2004, 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 26-27, 30, 34, 38, 40, 43. Just some of the failures that went on the morning of 9/11.

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